In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian solution.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a new set valued solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility that we call the equal split-off set. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it is inspired by the Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games (cf. Dutta and Ray (1989) ).
More precisely, we consider a world N of n players, N = {1, . . . , n}, who believe in equal share cooperation. For each coalition S ⊆ N, let the real number v(S) represent what the players in S can get if they cooperate (i.e. v(S) is the worth or the value of coalition S). We assume that the entire set of players will cooperate and deal with the question how the whole amount of money v(N ) generated by N should be divided among the players by considering the following step-wise process.
First, one of the coalitions with maximal average worth, say T 1 , forms and the players in T 1 divide equally the worth v(T 1 ). In step 2 one of the coalitions in N \ T 1 with maximal average marginal worth w.r.t. T 1 , say T 2 , forms, joins costless T 1 , and divides equally the increase in value v(T 2 ∪ T 1 ) − v(T 1 ) among its members. The process stops when a partition of N of the form hT 1 , . . . , T K i for some 1 ≤ K ≤ n is reached. This procedure generates a payoff vector x ∈ R n which we call an equal split-off allocation. The equal split-off set is then defined as consisting of all equal split-off allocations.
Notice that the difference between the above procedure and the Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex games is that the corresponding selected coalitions need not to be the largest 2 coalitions with the highest average worth.
The outline of this paper is as follows. After some preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce the equal split-off set for superadditive games in Section 3 and study some of its properties on this class of games. It turns out that any allocation in the equal split-off set is efficient and individually rational, and, in addition, it belongs to the equal division core of the corresponding game.
In Section 4 we concentrate on the class of convex games and prove that the equal split-off set of a convex game consists of a unique allocation which is the constrained egalitarian solution of that game. We conclude in Section 5 by pointing out some directions for further research.
Preliminaries
A TU-game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function on N satisfying v(∅) = 0. Often, we will identify a game (N, v) with its characteristic function v. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e. the members of S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
An allocation in a game v is a payoff vector x ∈ R n . An allocation of v(N ) such that this amount is cleared is called efficient, and an allocation 
Further, an allocation is called stable if any coalition S ⊆ N receives at least its value v(S). The core C(v) of a game v is the set of all efficient and stable allocations (Gillies, 1953) , i.e. the set
.
For each game v we have that C(v) is a subset of the equal division core EDC(v) of v. The latter concept was introduced by Selten (1972) as the set ½ 
The equal split-off set for superadditive games
Let v be a superadditive game and π = hT 1 , . . . , T K i be an ordered partition of the player set N . We set v 1 := v, and for each k ∈ {2, . . . , K} we define
We call the partition π = hT 1 , . . . ,
Given such a partition π, the equal split-off allocation for v generated by π is the payoff vector x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ R n , where for all T k ∈ π and all i ∈ T k ,
x is an equal split-off allocation for v generated by π} .
In order to illustrate this solution concept, let us have a look at the following examples:
Example 1 (2-person superadditive games) Let v be a game on the player
. Suppose without loss of generality that v(1) ≥ v(2) and consider the following four cases:
¢ª corresponding to the suitable ordered partitions h{1} , {2}i and h{1, 2}i;
, v (2))} corresponding to the three suitable ordered partitions h{1} , {2}i, h{2} , {1}i, and h{1, 2}i;
¢ª .
Example 2 (Simple games) In a simple game v on player set N we have that
Given a simple game v, we denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions with a smallest cardinality by W s . In the case of simple games
o because for any suitable ordered partition hT 1 , . . . , T K i we will have T 1 ∈ W s , and all players in T 1 will receive 1 |T 1 | whereas the players in N \ T 1 will receive payoff 0.
¢ª that can be generated by many suitable ordered partitions, where each element T k of such a partition has the property that
In case |L| > |R| each element x ∈ ESOS(v) satisfies
x i = 1 2 for each i ∈ R and for |R| elements of L, and x i = 0 for the other elements of L. Conversely, all elements of this type belong to ESOS(v).
One can easily check that the egalitarian split-off set in Examples 1-3 is a subset of the imputation set of the corresponding game. This fact turns out to be true for all superadditive games as is shown in
Proof. We have to prove that each allocation in ESOS(v) is efficient and individually rational. Take x ∈ ESOS(v) generated by a suitable ordered partition hT 1 , . . . , T K i.
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Then
i.e. x is efficient.
Take now an i ∈ N . We have to prove that x i ≥ v (i). Suppose i ∈ T r for some r ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then
where the first inequality follows from the definition of T r and the second inequality from the superadditivity of v. Hence, x is individually rational.
We conclude that x ∈ I(v), ESOS(v) ⊆ I(v).
Our next proposition shows a monotonicity property of each suitable ordered partition of N with respect to a superadditive game.
Proposition 2
Let v be a superadditive game and let hT 1 , . . . , T K i be a suit-
This inequality is equivalent to
which is at its turn equivalent to
We show next that the equal split-off set of a superadditive game is a refinement of the equal division core of that game.
Theorem 1 Let v be a superadditive game. Then ESOS(v) ⊆ EDC(v).
Proof. Let x ∈ ESOS(v) be generated by the suitable ordered partition
Let m ∈ {1, . . . , K} be the smallest number such that T m ∩ S 6 = ∅.
where the first inequality follows from the superadditivity of v and the second inequality from the definition of T m . Note that
The next example provides a game for which the equal split-off set is a strict subset of the equal division core.
and v be a glove game with L = {1, 2}
The equal split-off set for convex games
We start this section with a lemma that holds for arbitrary TU-games and will play an important role when proving that the equal split-off set of a convex game consists of a single allocation which is the Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution of that game.
Lemma 1
Let v be a TU-game and let hT 1 , . . . , T K i be a suitable ordered partition of N w.r.t. v by means of marginal games v 1 , . . . , v K . Let T m+1 , . . . , T q be a sequence of coalitions from the ordered partition such that
By summing up these equalities we obtain v m+1
Let hD 1 , . . . , D P i be the ordered partition of N according to the Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution DR(v) of a convex game v. In each step p ∈ {1, . . . , P } of the Dutta-Ray algorithm D p is the largest element in the set
We recall that for each p ∈ {1, . . . , P } the set M p has a lattice structure w.r.t. the partial ordering of inclusion. So,
For further use we introduce also the following notation:
The next proposition will play a key role in this section. 
Further, since D p is the largest set in N \ D p−1 with average worth d p ,
and
To conclude that (1) and (2) hold we have only to show still that there is S * ∈ 2 Dp\T such that v T (S * ) = d p |S * |.
Since (#) holds we can take an
and A * T . Then A ⊆ D p . If A ∩ T = ∅, we take S * = A; otherwise we take
where the last equality follows from
and |S * ∪ T | = |S * | + |T |.
We show now that the equal split-off set of a convex game consists of a unique allocation which is precisely the constrained egalitarian solution of that game. We prove by induction that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K} the following property (P k ) holds:
First, note that (P 1 ) holds with s 1 = 1. 
